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Abstract
Over the last 20 years the number of overweight and obese has risen in Denmark as
well as globally. More recently, it has been proposed in the media that a differen-
tiated VAT should be employed in order to change people’s dietary habits towards
a more healthy diet. This paper seeks to analyse the welfare implications of us-
ing price instruments in health policy. We do this by estimating the Almost Ideal
(AI) Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) and using the parameters
to perform a counterfactual policy experiment where the VAT on sugary foods is
increased by 12.5 percentage points. Implications are analysed in two ways; firstly,
we estimate the aggregate welfare loss from the tax distortion to DKK 1.69 billion.
This can be used by health professionals as a benchmark criterion for the monetized
welfare gains from e.g. healthier diets. Secondly, since micro data has been em-
ployed it is possible to analyse the distribution of welfare losses on household level.
We conclude that losses and gains appear to follow the same distribution. All in all,
we find that VAT differentiation is a good instrument in Danish health policy.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Developments over the past 20 years clear
ly point in the direction of an obesity epi-
demic. From 1987 to 2005, the proportion of
overweight in the Danish population has in-
creased from 30.8% to 44.3% while the pro-
portion of obese has risen even more drasti-
cally from 5.5% to 11.4%1. The need for po-
1Source:
http://susy2.si-folkesundhed.dk/susy.aspx.
litical action seems evident but it is not clear
what path should be chosen. So far, the Dan-
ish response has been primarily in the form of
information campaigns, but lately the idea of
using taxation as a health policy instrument
has been discussed in the media (see e.g. For-
brugerrådet (2007)) as well as academically
(Jensen, Astrup, Haraldsdo´ttir, Frandsen, Holm,
Jepsen, Kærgård, and Rosenørn (2007)).
The advantage of using taxation is that it
would affect the entire target group. How-
ever, taxation generally distorts incentives and
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thus creates a welfare loss which is not im-
posed by campaigns. The present paper con-
tributes to this discussion by providing a quan-
titative estimate of the magnitude that such a
welfare loss might have and by analysing the
distribution of such costs. The latter is im-
portant since redistributing the welfare gains
is potentially very difficult.
1.2 What’s new
Our paper provides two major contribu-
tions; firstly, the model has not (to the au-
thors’ awareness) previously been estimated
on the Danish Annual Household Survey data.
These data are then merged with the very rich
Danish register data which enable the use of
typically unavailable but theoretically essen-
tial variables such as income. Secondly, we
provide a quantitative analysis of the distor-
tionary welfare loss that would arise from us-
ing taxation as a health policy instrument in
Denmark. The latter is possible due to the
fact that the Almost Ideal (AI) Demand Sys-
tem of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) is de-
rived directly from an explicit cost function.
We can then use the estimated parameters to
perform a counterfactual policy experiment
where we calculate each household’s com-
pensating variation (CV) from a VAT increase
of 12.5 percentage points2. We analyse two
aspects of the household welfare losses; the
aggregate size and the distribution. The most
novel part is arguably the latter, which is made
possible by using micro-level data and aggre-
gate consumption categories to model house-
hold heterogeneity. This approach disregards
within-category composition changes, and in
this sense we rely heavily on Smed, Jensen,
2The CV is the monetary compensation required to
keep utility constant after the price change.
and Denver (2007) who establish that these
changes are indeed for the healthier3.
Overall, however, the study of obesity as
a societal problem is interdisciplinary, and as
such the present paper is meant to be used
by policy makers in conjunction with health
research.
1.3 Can taxation be efficient?
— An internality-approach
Before estimating the model, however, we
need to establish a theoretical framework within
which imposing a tax on unhealthy foods is
sensible. Recall that taxing individuals is gen-
erally inefficient. However, Dodd (2008) ar-
gues that in regard to eating unhealthy foods,
agents might have present-biased preferences,
meaning that they make choices they will later
regret. In this sense, the unhealthy consump-
tion may be viewed as a within-person ex-
ternality, an internality4. In analogue to tra-
ditional externalities, the full cost of the be-
haviour is not realized by the agent and this
gives rise to possible efficiency gains from
taxation. See O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)
for a formal model with explicit requirements
on preferences and behaviour where taxing
unhealthy food products will be pareto opti-
mal.
3Smed, Jensen, and Denver (2007) also estimate an
AI model on a Danish data set, but their focus is on the
composition of the diet resulting from using VAT as a
health policy instrument. To do this they need highly
detailed categories, but this yields too many corner solu-
tions so they choose to work with aggregated consump-
tion instead. However, this rules out modelling house-
hold heterogeneity, for which they rely on the descriptive
work from Smed (2002).
4Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, and Vaughan Jr.
(1993) provide comprehensive evidence of internalities
being performed in controlled experiments.
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2 Model overview
2.1 Notation
Vectors will be written in boldface and
will always be thought of as columns. We
will be working with K categories of goods
and let the price of the k’th good be denoted
by pk. Furthermore, x is total nominal expen-
ditures, sk is the share of expenditures used
on the k’th category and greek letters signify
parameters to be estimated.
2.2 Model formulation
The Almost Ideal (AI) Demand System
of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) is based
on the Price Independent Generalized Loga-
rithmic (PIGLOG) preference representation
where the log cost function is a weighted av-
erage of two different price indices. From
this structural model of preferences, the fol-
lowing estimation equation for the i’th budget
share, si, is derived under the assumption of
utility maximization:
si = αi +
K∑
k=1
γik ln pk + βi ln
{ x
P
}
, (2.1)
i = 1, . . . ,K
where P is a price index defined by
ln P ≡ α0 +
K∑
k=1
αk ln pk
+
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
j=1
γk j ln pk ln p j.
The reader is referred to Deaton and Muell-
bauer (1980b) for a detailed derivation. It can
be shown that the γik’s will have approxima-
tely the same sign as the cross-price elasti-
cities; however, the exact formulas for these
will be given in section 5.2.
Note that (2.1) is inherently non-linear due
to the parameters in P which appear in the
term βi(ln x − ln P) all being multiplied by
βi. As Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a), we
will deal with this by replacing P with a li-
near approximation to avoid using non-linear
methods.
Since (2.1) may hold even if the structural
model of preferences on which it is based is
incorrect, we may think of the parameters in
the simple OLS way. For instance, γik is the
semi-elasticity of budget share of good i with
respect to the price of good k.
2.2.1 Theoretical restrictions
Standard economic theory rules out certain
irrational patterns(which are deemed “irratio-
nal”). Specifically, we will require the model
to satisfy the properties of adding up, homo-
geneity, and Slutsky-symmetry. Adding up is
imposed at estimation5 whereas homogenei-
ty and symmetry are tested as linear restri-
ctions on the coefficients in a Wald-type test6.
However, in practice the validity of these tests
is questionable and often they are imposed
at estimation (see e.g. Buse (1994); Blundell,
Pashardes, and Weber (1993)) so we will not
pay much attention to them.
5In particular, we leave out the last equation, fixing
coefficients so that they satisfy
∑K
k=1 αk = 1,
∑K
k=1 βk = 0
and
∑K
k=1 γk j = 0.
6Homogeneity means that
∑K
k=1 γ jk = 0 for j =
1, ...,K and symmetry means that γk j = γ jk for all pairs
k, j = 1, . . . ,K.
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3 Data
3.1 The Danish Household Budget Survey
The consumption data used in the present
paper are from the Danish Household Bud-
get Survey7, which is conducted by Statistics
Denmark and are courtesy of the Rockwool
Research Unit. The data used cover the pe-
riod 1997–2005 giving us an effective sam-
ple of about 7,700 households. A unique fea-
ture is that the data are merged onto the com-
prehensive Danish register data which for in-
stance give us access to income, labour mar-
ket status, marital status, etc.
For price information we used the monthly
EU-harmonized consumer price index for the
groups matching our chosen categories (cf.
section 3.2). This is similar to many other
demand analyses (see e.g. Banks, Blundell,
and Lewbel (1997); Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980a)) but differs from Smed, Jensen, and
Denver (2007) who observe the actual price
paid in their data set.
3.2 Choice of categories
When choosing the level of detail, one
must balance two trade-offs: Categories must
be sufficiently detailed for consumption be-
haviour to be homogenous and sufficiently gen-
eral to avoid too many households with zero
consumption8.
We choose to work with four categories
of food; sugar-based (“candy”), fruit, vegeta-
bles, and other foods. The idea is that we
are able to distinguish between healthy and
7An extensive description is given online;
www.dst.dk/Ve jviser/Portal/Forbrug/Baggrundsin f o.aspx
8Essentially we are working with a censored regres-
sion since households are unable to choose negative bud-
get shares. Barslund (2007) handles this in a Tobit-type
framework, but we follow the rest of the literature and
ignore the problem to avoid non-linear estimation.
unhealthy foods. The idea is that we — to
some degree — are able to distinguish be-
tween healthy and unhealthy food. Splitting
vegetables and fruit is perhaps the most con-
troversial, but we found that the consump-
tion behaviour for these groups was too dif-
ferent to justify joint modelling. In addition
to these, we use six other categories9 for the
system to be complete but since they were
separable from food consumption, we exclude
them from the exposition altogether.
3.3 Descriptive analysis
Figures 1 and 2 show the development in
prices and shares for the most relevant con-
sumption categories — interested readers are
referred to Statistics Denmark for further de-
tails. To accommodate space constraints we
exclude any detailed analysis. However, not-
ing the high volatility of all series, we have
performed a simple analysis of the correla-
tion structure between the pairs of prices and
quantities. For fruit and to some extent for
vegetables we even found positive correlation.
This is interpreted as an indication of the im-
portance of handling heterogeneity explicitly,
and thus we take advantage of the data set and
include a wide range of demographic vari-
ables.
4 Estimation
4.1 Linearisation
Like Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) we
choose to approximate the price index ln P in
(2.1) with the Stone Price Index given as
ln P∗ =
K∑
k=1
sk ln pk (4.1)
9These are Alcohol and Tobacco, Clothing and
Footwear, Housing, Electricity and Heating, Communi-
cation, Other Goods and Services.
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Figure 1: Development in the consumption of candy, fruit, and vegetables, as shares of total consump-
tion
Figure 2: Price development for selected categories
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Note that since prices differ between house-
holds, so will the price index.
Another approach would be to estimate
the full model (2.1) directly using non-linear
methods. This approach has the advantage that
the exact model is estimated instead of a line-
ar approximation and — as we will discuss in
section 4.2 — there is no need for instrumen-
tal variables. On the other hand the model has
very many parameters and thus optimisation
routines will be quite demanding. Since an
instrument is readily available, we choose the
linearised specification.
4.2 Instrumental variables approach
Since the budget shares appear in the Stone
price index, we get an equation in which the
explained variable appears on both sides, lead-
ing to an endogeneity problem. We choose to
follow Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997)
and use income as an instrument for the de-
flated total expenditures. The argument for
the exogeneity of income is usually based on
an assumption of intertemporal separability
and it is widely discussed in the literature10.
Often, however, income is not available which
is why many authors make no mention of it
— in this sense our data set enables us to go
further than many others given that exogene-
ity holds. The instrument turned out to be
relevant empirically.
4.3 Control variables
We allow demographics to influence the
explanatory variables only through the inter-
10See e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b). Lewbel
and Pendakur (2009) moreover mention that one prob-
lem with using income is that it does not account for
dynamic aspects and that wealth would thus be a better
instrument. This was, however, not possible in our study
due to data issues.
cept and thus assume that no significant in-
teraction effects are present11. In the follow-
ing, we briefly argue for the inclusion of the
most important demographic variables indi-
vidually.
Smed (2002) presents evidence that age
(age) is important, and following Banks, Blun-
dell, and Lewbel (1997) we also include age
squared (agesq). Number of individuals will
most likely play a part, and therefore we in-
clude the number of adult equivalents
(adultequivs) as calculated by Statistics Den-
mark. Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber (1993)
argue that the presence of children (haskids)
may have an effect on behaviour apart from
the sheer increase in household size, e.g. in
terms of requiring more accountability. Brown-
ing and Meghir (1991) present ample evidence
of bias resulting from the exclusion of labour
market status (employed) so we include a dummy
for employment. Lastly, we choose to in-
clude dummies for education level (educ2 for
high school level and educ3 for post secondary);
like Smed (2002), we believe that educated
people are better able to gather information
and thus learn about consequences of unhealthy
dietary habits, which would cause them to
change their diets12.
4.4 Estimation equation
Summing up, we can now state our esti-
mation equation, which we write for the i’th
11This was tested to some extent (the number of pa-
rameters increases immensely when interactions are in-
cluded) and we found no important evidence against the
choice.
12Others such as Browning and Meghir (1991) view
education as an indicator for taste and use it as an instru-
ment instead.
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category for household h = 1, ...,H as
sih = αi +
K∑
k=1
γik ln pkh + βi ln
{
xh
P∗h
}
(4.2)
+
L∑
l=1
θlCl + εih i = 1, ...,K
where ln P∗h is the price-index defined in
(4.1) and (C1, ... ,CL) denote the L demographic
variables used. The equation will be estimated
with a 3 Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estima-
tor as implemented in Stata’s reg3 proce-
dure. We will be using household income
as an instrument for ln{xh/P∗h} to solve the
endogeneity problem. We also supply tests
for the restrictions of homogeneity and sym-
metry (as mentioned in section 2.2.1), both
of which are implemented as standard Wald
tests since the restrictions are linear.
5 Results
In this section, we present the most im-
portant estimates for the model (4.2). The
model has 260 coefficients, so we will focus
on those relevant to the food categories as the
remaining categories are only included to en-
sure a consistent demand system. Overall we
found that a very general setting with many
demographic variables gave more plausible
estimates.
5.1 Results from the final model
Table 1 presents a selection of the param-
eter estimates for the final model.
The first five rows are of primary interest
in our analysis, but we will discuss these in
more detail when we calculate the price and
budget elasticities in section 5.2. However,
we note that the share of fruit varies posi-
tively with the price of fruit.
We turn to the demographics. Firstly, we
note that homogeneity is accepted but sym-
metry is rejected, which is in line with the
literature. Secondly, we see that lnx- Real
(i.e. βi in eq. (4.2)) is significantly negative
for all four food categories, labelling these as
necessities. This is in accordance with stan-
dard theory. Our budget coefficient for the lar-
ge food category, Other Foods, (−0.056) is
significantly smaller than what Jensen and Toft-
kær (2002) find in another Danish data set
(−0.116). However, we both find that no pri-
ces are significant in that equation.
The quarterly dummies are included to hand-
le seasonality and although they are insigni-
ficant, excluding them led to unsatisfactory
modelling of the equations for fruit and ve-
getables. Since these two goods in particu-
lar are affected by seasonality, we conclude
that their exclusion results in an endogenei-
ty problem and hence we keep them. A more
adequate description of the goods, including
e.g. quality of the fruit, would be preferable
but this is not available in our data set.
Generally, we find that demographics af-
fects consumption in a way consistent with
economic theory. In particular, we note that
the presence of children only affects candy
(increasing it) even after correction for the
number of individuals. Since it does not in-
crease consumption of healthy food, we see
no evidence in support of a more responsible
behaviour in response to having children.
5.2 Comparison with the literature
In order to provide a better basis for as-
sessing the validity of the results, we now
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Table 1: Parameter Estimates for the Four Food Equations
Equation:
Candy Fruit Vegetables Other foods
priceCandy -0.00183 -0.03001 -0.00827 -0.04095
priceFruit -0.00167 0.01948** 0.00044 -0.03613
priceVegetables 0.01376* 0.00822 0.01540** -0.00716
priceOtherfoods 0.01931 -0.01184 0.01530 0.16503
lnxReal -0.00964*** -0.00448*** -0.00784*** -0.05624***
Quarter2 0.00023 0.00039 0.00120 -0.00183
Quarter3 0.00073 -0.00070 0.00065 -0.00131
Quarter4 0.00030 0.00132 -0.00127 -0.00921***
employed 0.00215* 0.00023 -0.00036 0.00004
hoursworked -0.00003 -0.00001 0.00000 -0.00001
single -0.00261** -0.00196** -0.00698*** -0.03174***
haskids 0.00390*** 0.00026 0.00015 0.00918***
singlewithkids 0.00348** 0.00090 0.00250** 0.01558***
age -0.00016 0.00010 0.00049*** 0.00262***
agesq 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000*** -0.00002***
male -0.00214*** -0.00243*** -0.00235*** 0.00478***
adultequivs 0.00980*** 0.00435*** 0.00364*** 0.03055***
educ2 0.00034 0.00023 0.00069* 0.00033
educ3 0.00048 0.00207*** 0.00231*** 0.00061
cons -0.01610 -0.00321 -0.01951 0.73425
Tests
H0 : Homogenity ξHom = 14.91
a∼ χ2(9), p = 0.0935
H0 : Symmetry ξSym = 132.03
a∼ χ2(36), p < 0.0001
*: p < 5%, **: p < 1%, ***: p < 0.1%
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calculate13 the own-price elasticities () and
budget elasticities (ρ) and compare them to
what other researchers have found. As Banks,
Blundell, and Lewbel (1997), we report a
weighted average of the households’ elastici-
ties using their share of total expenditures as
weights. he standard errors are complicated
functions of the parameters involved and will
not be calculated here, although they could
also be obtained from bootstrapping methods,
for example.
We note that we are comparing our re-
sults to studies somewhat different from our
own. However, each study maintains that it
identifies the same fundamental behavioural
parameters. Most importantly, it should be
noted that all studies considered in table 2 be-
low except Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber
(1993) are based on aggregated categories.
This ensures fewer corner solutions but has
the disadvantage that heterogeneity cannot be
controlled for.
Candy: Our  (own-price elasticity) es-
timate seems plausible whereas our ρ (bud-
get elasticity) is difficult to assess but seems
plausible.
Fruit: Although the ρ estimate is very
close to that of Jensen and Toftkær (2002),
we get a positive  estimate. We view this as
a failure to handle the fruit category properly,
and we believe that the source is the missing
information on product quality14.
Vegetables: Our estimate of ρ seems plau-
13Like Jensen and Toftkær (2002) and Smed, Jensen,
and Denver (2007) we calculate them as ρih = 1 + βi/sih
and ih =
(
γii − βi [βi ln{xh/Ph} − sih − γii ln pih]) /sih −
1.
14Although there may have been behavioural
changes in the period since the results were highly sensi-
tive to the introduction of seasonal dummies. One reason
could be the health campaign “6 om dagen” which was
launched in 2001.
sible whereas our  estimate is numerically
smaller than what others have found. How-
ever, we found parameter estimates in this
equation to be particularly sensitive to the in-
clusion of demographics, indicating that the
disadvantage in aggregated analyses from not
modelling heterogeneity (e.g. education) might
be particularly bad here.
Other foods: This is the largest category
used in our study. We find a ρ coefficient
close to that of Blundell, Pashardes, and We-
ber (1993) although our  estimate is half the
magnitude they find. However, given that this
category is much larger and less homogenous,
these results may stem from the lack of a pre-
cise price index for this “residual category”.
5.3 Conclusion
The model appears to handle the consump-
tion of the candy category satisfactorily. The
fruit category is not satisfactorily modelled,
but since its cross-price is insignificant we
may in the following focus on candy alone.
6 Welfare analysis and policy experiment
In this section we perform a counterfac-
tual policy analysis using the estimated coef-
ficients from table 1.
6.1 Calculating the welfare loss
We consider an increase in the price of
candy of 10 pct. which would correspond to
an increase in the VAT on candy of 12.5 pct.
points. We want an increase that is sizable
enough to give a reaction while still respect-
ing that we are using a linear model15. We
15For comparison, Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel
(1997) consider a VAT increase on clothes of 17.5 pct.
points, but they employ quadratics in a non-linear frame-
work which may be better suited to handling larger in-
creases.
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Table 2: Own-Price Elasticities () and Budget Elasticities (ρ)
Candy Fruit Vegetables Other Foods
 ρ  ρ  ρ  ρ
Our results -1.1124 0.5956 0.3803 0.1672 -0.33312 0.6321 -0.2550 0.5451
Smed, Jensen, and
Denver (2007)
[-1.3;-0.6] . [-1.7;-0.4] . [-1,5;-0.9] . . .
Jensen and Toftkær
(2002)
-1.01 0.163 -0.807 0.172 -0.807 0.172 -0.38 0.20
Edgerton (1997) 0.68 -0.57 -0.63 0.66 -0.63 0.66 . .
Blundell, Pashardes, and
Weber (1993)
. . . . . . -0.514 0.501
A “.” indicates that the estimate in question is not provided in the paper.
Smed and Denver (2004) report estimates for different social groups separately. We present the range they fall in.
Jensen and Toftkær (2002) use one group for fruit and vegetables together.
Edgerton (1997) also uses one group for fruit and vegetables together.
are not modelling the supply side and thus
implicitly assume that the tax increase is ab-
sorbed completely into the prices. Jensen,
Astrup, Haraldsdo´ttir, Frandsen, Holm, Jepsen,
Kærgård, and Rosenørn (2007) argue that this
is in fact a reasonable assumption in a Danish
context.
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) derive the
estimation equation (1.3) directly from an ex-
plicit cost function. By plugging our esti-
mated coefficients into this we are able to cal-
culate the compensating variation, CVh, for
each individual household for a given change
in the prices16. We can then use the weights
of representativeness from the data set to ag-
gregate from our sample to the total Danish
population. Thus, we estimate total CV to
DKK 2.48 billion.
16To be precise we calculate it as CVh(x,p0,p1) ≡
c(ψ(x,p0),p1) − c(ψ(x,p0),p0), where c(·) is the (log)
cost function given in eq. (1) of Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980a) and ψ(·) is the indirect utility function given as
ψ(x,p) ≡ (ln x − ln a(p))/ ln b(p), where a(·) and b(·) are
the price indices given as eq. (2) and (3) of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980a).
However, the higher VAT will generate a
higher tax revenue, which is a welfare gain as
it can be used, for example, to reduce harm-
ful income taxes (although we will assume
that DKK 1 of tax revenue will generate ex-
actly DKK 1 of welfare). Using the formula
of (Varian, 2006, p. 275) and the substitution
patterns derived from the estimated elastici-
ties, we find that the policy will imply an in-
crease in tax revenue of DKK 0.79 billion17.
The resulting welfare loss in billion DKK
can now be calculated as:
Total welfare loss = CVtotal − ∆T
= 2.48 − 0.79 = 1.69
17Let ∆T be the change in tax revenue, ∆τ the
change in tax rate on candy in percentage points, q0candy
the total quantity of candy consumed at time 0, p0candy
the weighted average of prices at time 0 and candy
the weighted average of own-price elasticities of candy.
Then
∆T = ∆τ·p1candy·q1candy = 0.125·1.1p0candy·(1+0.1candy)q0candy
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This tells us that the policy on a yearly ba-
sis must generate DKK 1.69 billion in wel-
fare improvements for the total effect to be
zero. Such gains would have to come primar-
ily from an improved public health in which
for example internalities as described in sec-
tion 1.3 would be addressed. If the gains ex-
ceed 1.69 billion and the policy maker can
redistribute the welfare gains without costs,
the policy will be pareto efficient.
6.2 Taking heterogeneity into account
The assumption of cost-free redistribution
of the welfare gains is particularly unrealis-
tic in the present context as it is excessively
difficult to assess the size of a given individ-
ual’s loss — whether the individual is un-
healthy because it is cheap to be so or be-
cause he prefers to be so. The Coase The-
orem also fails as we cannot enable present
individuals to trade with their future selves
(see Dodd (2008), for an elaboration). Fur-
thermore, it would presumably be politically
infeasible to pay back households differently
in practice. Hence, it is relevant to analyse a
setting where the state is unable to take con-
sumer heterogeneity into account when de-
signing the pay back scheme. We choose to
look at a situation where the entire amount
is paid back as a lump sum to each house-
hold18. This means that each household will
receive DKK 0.79 billion / 2.47 million Dan-
ish households  DKK 316.
It would be natural to compare this with
an estimate of each household’s welfare gain;
however, no such estimate is readily avail-
able. To assess the distributional aspects of
18Alternatively, one might choose to pay back a
lump-sum to each individual, but since the model is esti-
mated using households as the unit we choose the above
approach.
the policy we choose instead to look at a bench-
mark case in which the welfare gains are of a
magnitude such that the net welfare change is
zero, i.e. the welfare gains amount to DKK
1.69 billion. We have tried using different
household characteristics to display the dis-
tribution but have found that the age of the
household head captures almost all relevant
aspects.
6.2.1 Uniformly distributed welfare gains
We first analyse a setting in which the gains
are uniformly distributed across households.
Each household must then have a monetised
gain of DKK 1,690 / 2.47 million Danish house-
holds DKK 684. Figure 3 shows the aver-
age CV for each age category and the dashed
(blue) line indicates the total welfare gain,
which is the same for all households in this
setting.
We see that under the given assumptions,
households with household head aged 30–60
will suffer a net loss whereas those below 30
and above 60 will experience a net gain. It is
clear that this result depends crucially on the
fact that tax refunds are uniform over hou-
seholds. If instead these were chosen to de-
pend on the number of individuals in the hou-
sehold, it is clear that families with children
would receive larger refunds whereas the yo-
ungest and oldest on average would receive
less. This would point further in the direction
that gains and losses are consistent.
6.2.2 Non-uniformly distributed welfare gains
It seems reasonable that the welfare gains
would instead follow some non-uniform dis-
tribution. The closer this distribution of the
gains (the dashed line in figure 3) is to that
of the losses (the black line) the less damag-
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Note: The dashed line indicates the level of the average compensating variation (DKK 1.003).
Data for household heads below 20 years of age is excluded due to the low number of observations.
Figur 3: Average Compensating Variation (CV) by Age of Household Head
ing the payback scheme is19. However, since
it lies beyond our professional expertise to
make conjectures in that direction, we will
instead use the focus groups of the Danish
health campaign “6 om dagen” (En: 6 a day)
as this campaign was designed by health pro-
fessionals. The target groups are; men, young
people, and families with children20. Since
families with children are usually in the age
groups 30–45, welfare gains for this group
appear to be consistent with the losses in fi-
gure 3. In contrast, young people have much
smaller losses (cf. figure 3) meaning that they
might experience excessively high net gains.
Since we use the household as the basic uni-
19This is of course for a given level of the total wel-
fare gains, i.e. the area below the dashed line in figure
3. Naturally, if this is shifted up (down) vertically the
policy becomes more (less) attractive.
20See http://6omdagen.dk/kampagne/bilag/
6omdagengrundlag08 11 final.pdf.
ty, it does not make sense to split up by gen-
der so we cannot see if men have higher los-
ses. Lastly, we note that since the elderly are
not in the target groups, it is fortunate that
they also have smaller welfare losses. Summ-
ing up, our results appear to indicate that the
welfare losses are distributed in accordance
with the gains except for the youngest. Howe-
ver, this group is also relatively poor. In fact,
further calculations showed that the youngest
households experience the largest loss relati-
ve to their income, so perhaps it is also fair
that they have a surplus welfare gain.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed the effect
of a policy where the Danish VAT on candy
would be increased by 12.5 pct. points. Our
most firm conclusion is that the policy should
never be implemented unless the total national
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welfare gains exceed DKK 1.69 billion yearly.
It lies beyond our professional expertise to
conjecture as to the size of the welfare gains
from healthier diets etc. as this belongs in
health research. Moreover, we have analysed
the distributional aspects of the welfare losses
and compared these to a realistic conjecture
based on the choice of focus group in a major
Danish health campaign and concluded that
household level gains and losses appear to be
in agreement. This means that the implemen-
tation would be unlikely to require excessive
reallocations, which is an important concern
for the policy makers as this can be overly
difficult or maybe even impossible.
Generally, the model was found to per-
form well in the sense that the derived elas-
ticities were similar to the rest of the litera-
ture. The candy category was chosen as pol-
icy experiment as the model performed par-
ticularly well here. We acknowledge, how-
ever, that our model does not take dynamics
into account and that a more satisfying model
would consider the life-cycle dietary aspects.
Also, it would be prefereable to use a panel
data set to handle unobserved individual spe-
cific effects but our data set was limited in
this sense. Even so, we find no indication in
our results or in the literature that our results
should deviate excessively from the truth.
All in all, we conclude that taxation would
be a sensible instrument in Danish health pol-
icy provided that aggregate yearly welfare gains
are believed to exceed DKK 1.69 billion yearly.
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